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lTT.Al£ and HAL S. BE·N NETT, DONA.LD ILACI~ING and RAYMOND· W.
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n Corporation,
Defendants.

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS
~T ..-\TE~IEXT

OF THE KIND OF CAS·E

Thi ~ an appeal from an order of the Public ·S ervice

Collllnis8ion of l . . tah dismissing the complaint of plain-
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tiffs and the order to show cause issued thereon. Sueh
complaint prayed for an order vacating bi-monthly t( lllporary permits "\Yhich had been issued by the Commission
to Wycoff Company, Incorporated, and determining that
the same should not he issued in the futurP since thP
Commission has no jurisdiction to issue ten1porary
authority to common, as distinguished from contract,
carriers.
1

DISPOSITION OF CASE BEFO·RE
THE P'UBLIC SERVICE CO~Il\IISSIOX
'The complaint of Continental Bus Systein, Inc., and
D·enver-Salt Lake-Pacific Stages, Inc. prayed for an
order vacating the temporary per1nit issued to Wycoff
Company, Incorporated, hereinafter called Wycoff, authorizing it to transport contractors' and machinery
dealers' repair parts, supplies and equipment between
all points and places in the State of l 1tab. Upon hearing,
in which other common carriers joined as intervenors
and complainants, the Public Service Commission dismissed the complaint and declared its order to show
cause satisfied. This appeal relates to such order.
R.ELIEF SOlTGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiffs seek to set aside the Commission order
dismissing said complaint and vacating the Commission's
order to sho"\v cause, and a derision of this Court d(lelar-
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1

ing- that the ( otntni~~ion has no jurisdiction to issue a
tPtnporary pertnit authorizing <'Oinmon carrier service
without hearing or notieP, and directing the Com1nission
to eun<'Pl any ~neh pPrinit i~sued to Wycoff.

The rPcord consi~ts of stipulations of the parties on
hParing and Co1nmission declarations, including Comtni~~ion orders and te1nporary pPrmits included in the
record. ThP complaint of Continental Bus System, Inc.
and DenYPr-Salt Lake-Pacific Stages, Inc. was filed
January :2:.!, 1963 (R. S7). At that time, the Commission
had i~~ued a ~t\riP~ of successive sixty day temporary
pertnit~ to \ rycoff, the first of 'vhich 'vas issued on
J[ay 31, 1961, and the laton November 21, 1962 (R. 88).

In fart, the Com1nission continued to consecutively issue
the ~ixty day tPinporary authority permits to the date
of the Conunission order on February 7, 1964 ( R. 96)
~u1d continued to do so to the date of the filing of the

record ""ith the Supre1ne Court and to date hereof.
( EnYPlope adjacent R. :28.)
Each of such per1nits is for a sixty day period, and
tht\re i~ thn~ a eontinuous grant of temporary authority
fro1u ~lay 31, 1961 to ~[arch 18, 1964, as the record
~hn\r~. 1,hi~ is a total period of almost three years.

Entili pern1it authorized ''Tycoff to transport contractors'
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and machinery dealers' repair parts, supplies and rquipment for contractor and equipment dealers bPt,veen all
points and places in the State of Utah. On most of the
permits, the following notation appears:
''Item Six. Contractors' repair parts, supplies and equipment, in e1nergency shipments to
repair or job locations. This temporary emergency authority shall not be additional to but
merely supplemental of express authority ( Certificate No. 1162-Sub 2) held by Wycoff, restricted to movements of said contractors' items
to and from high"'"ay construction jobs and to
items which may occasionally exceed the 100
pounds per shipment limitation and/or total express which by reason of said emergency shipment may occasionally exceed 500 pounds of express on one authorized schedule. This temporary
authority shall not be used as a basis to support
permanent authority."
The temporary permits 'vere generally issued pursuant to a form letter addressed to Wycoff, one of which
is in the record, reading as follows (italics supplied):
"Wycoff Company, Incorporated
P. 0. Box 366
Salt Lake City 10, Utah
Attn : l\fax Young, \Tice President
Re:

lTtah Forn1 A-29, Application for a temporary permit to operate as a motor carriPr of contractors' and machinery dealers'
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5
repair parts, supplies and equipment in
rtnergency shipments to repair or job locations betwPen all points and places in the
state.
DPar Sir:
In connection with the above-captioned mattPr, you are advised that the Commission has issued the Pnclosed Utah Form BR-136, Temporary
Permit No. A-515, granting temporary authority
as applied for.
The instant temporary permit is issued under
the provisions of Title 5·4-6-10, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, and the rules and regulations of the Commission prescribed thereunder,
for a period of sixty (60) days, effective September 22, 1963, and expiring November 19, 1963,
and the same shall remain in full force and effect
for such period unless otherwise canceled by the
Con1mission for cause.
1

Should additional temporary authority be required, you are directed to make application for
extension in ample time to assure continuance of
your t rnnsportation service.
'"?"ery truly yours,

PUBLIC SERVICE. CO·MMIS.SIO·N"
During this period, Wycoff was operating under
Certificate of Convenience and Necessity No. 1162, Sub
~ (R.. 7~) authorizing transportation as a common carriPr of general commodities in express service, subject
to certain conditions and restrictions, including a limitaSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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tion on each shipment of 100 pounds, \Yith total limit of
500 pounds on any one schedule, \vhich schedules are to
coincide with newspaper movements. The proceeding in
which this common carrier certificate was issued "~a~
reviewed by this Court in Lakeshore Motor Coach LinP-s,
Inc. vs. Bennett, (1958) 8 U.2d 293, 333 P.2d 1061.
Not withstanding the fact that there were numerous
interested carriers within l'tah, no notirP of any kind
was even given by the Commission prior to or subsequent to the issuance of the line of temporary autllorities for the three year period (R. 8). \Vhere permanent
contract authority is issued, the Commission practice
requires the contract between carrier and shipper to be
filed with the Commission (R. 12). The contract, an1ong
other things, sets forth the charge for the transportation
movement and is thus a substitute for a tariff (R. 13).
In this case, no such contract was ever filed \\'ith the
Commission in connection \\~ith the temporary authorities issued (R. 14).
The major regular route conunon carriers operating
within Utah appeared as either con1plainants or intPrvenors in support of the complaint. They had also appeared in protest to the express authority proceeding
in Lakeshore JJ! otor Coach Lines, Inc. vs. Brnnett, supra.
Their routes extend throughout the state, and their
common carrier operating authorities are set forth in
\' olu1ne 2 of the record. All of such carriers are currently conducting transportation operations pursuant to
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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thrir authoritiPs and during all of the period involved
thPy handled thP type of traffic which the temporary
authority authorized Wycoff to transport (R. 12). 'The
operations of ~1 i lnr Truck Lines, Inc. ( R. 48-50) generally Pxtend from Salt ~Lake City through Fillmore, ·C edar
City, nnd St. George via U. S. Highway 91, as well as
to ntnnerous other points in the southwestern portion
of lTt.nh. Palmer Brothers, Inc. (R. 51-52) operates
hPbrPPn Salt Lake City and Fillmore via U. S· Highway
9l, and it serves Delta and the central and western area
of lTtah. It also serves central and southern Utah, generally bet\\?Pen Salt Lake City through Richfield and Kanab
to the .Arizona border, generally via U. S. Highway 89.
Rio Grande ~Iotorway, Inc. (R.53-59) generally operates
behrPen Salt Lake City and Provo, and through Price
to the Colorado border via U. S. Highway 50, including
nnnlPron~ off-route points in Emery, Carbon and Utah
Countit\s. Garrett Freight Lines, Inc. (R. 33-47) operatp~ hPt,veen Salt Lake City and points in Grand and
San Juan Counties, via U. S. Highways 91, 50 and 160,
~Prving the southeastern portion of Utah. Uintah
Fn\ight\\ ays (R. 60) as well as Link Trucking, Inc. (R.
:l9) operate generally bet\veen Salt Lake and Utah Countit\~ and liintah Basin points via U. S. Highway 40 and
othPr pertinent routes.
9

The bus lines offer an express service. ·Continental
Bus Systen1, Inc. (R.. 28-30) operates between Salt Lake
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City and the Utah-Colorado state line over lT. S. Highways 9'1 and 50, bet\VPPn Salt ;L ake City and Payson and
indicated intermediate points, and through the l\loab
and Monticello areas via U. S. H-ighways 50 and 160.
Also, it serves bet\v<~Pn l\farysvale, Utah and Kanab,
principally via lT. S. 1-Iighway 89. Denver-Salt LakePacific Stages, Inc. (R. 31-32) generally op~rates between Salt Lake City and the lTtah-Colorado state line
over U. S. Highway 40. Greyhound Lines, Inc. generally
operates over the principal l-," tah high\Yays in all part~
of the state, although its operating authority is not included in the actual authority exhibits. The bus lineR
in their express operation, and all of the truck linrR
named, are authorized to and are transporting the specific commodities for 'vhich te1nporary authority haR
been granted to \Vycoff.
;Based upon the Complaint, the Co1nmission issued
its ordPr to sho\v cause, \Yhich came on for hearing on
July 18, 196·3. The report and order disn1issing the
·C omplaint and order to sho\v cause "Tas not issued until
February 7, 19·64 (R. 129). During such interim, as
noted above, the Commission continued its policy of issuing temporary authority to \vT ycoff. Tht> order \vas
based upon the decision of Co1nmissioners Bennett and
Hacking, to ,,. hich Con1missionPr GeP dissented. His
dissent is attached as an appendix since it contains a
su1nmation of applicable law as applied to the facts
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of rt'<'onl. Petition for rehParing (R. 116) was filed
l•'t·hruary ~;), l~)().f, and ordPr denying the sa1ne issued
:\I u re h ;), 1964 ( R. 1~0) .
AI~ (; lTJ\IJ~jNT

POINT I.
THE ISSUANCE BY THE COMMISSION OF COMJ.\IION CARRIER TEMPORARY AUTHORITY IS CONTRARY TO APPLICABLE STATUTES, AND BEYOND THE JURISDICTION OF THE COMMISSION.

ThP ha~ie conePrn in this proceeding is "\vhether the
1notor earri.er industry in t~tah shall be regulated by
the Publ il' ~t\rvieP Co1nmission in a manner consistent
\vith ~peeifie statutory authorization and accepted principle~ of ht\\~ful ad1ninistration, or \vhether it shall be
regulatPd hy a proces8 of expediency, however well intt:'ntioned, 'vhich ignores the jurisdiction of the ComIni~~ion a~ established by specific legislative enactments
and violate8 thP most rudimentary concepts of due prol't\~~. The key8tone of this industry, \Yhich has invested
1nillion8 of dollars in plants and facilities, is the operatin~ authority of the various truck and bus lines. The
~:-~tt'lll of utility regulation, "\vhich restricts existing carrier~ in their conduct of the truck and bus operations,
conten1plates that if additional authoritv is to be issued
..

'

it i~ l'~~ential that it be done in a manner consistent

\\·ith the ~tatutory regulatory method established by the
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legislature and in accord with the power conferred upon
the :Commission. In its actions here, the Com1nission
thwarted the spirit and intent of the legislative method
of regulation.
In 1935, the legislature enacted the l\Iotor Vehicle
Transportation Act as ·Chapter Six of Title 54. That act
remain substantially unchanged. Section 54-6-1, U.C.A.
1953, defines a common motor carrier of property, as
~'any person 'vho holds himself out to the public as willing to undertake for hire to transport by motor vehicle
from place to place, the property of others who may
choose to employ him," and defines a contract motor
carrier of property as "any person engaged in transportation by motor vehicle of property for hire and not
included in the term common n1otor carrier of property
as hereinbefore defined."
Section 54-6-5, lT.C.A. 1953, provides for the issuance of a certificate of convenience and necessity to
operate as a common motor carrier, and Section 54-6-8,
U.C.A. 1953, for permit to operate as a contract carriPr.
In both instances, the statutes provide for a hearing
on the application, after notice, which permits interested carriers to appear and present testin1ony on the
issues. After hearing, the certificate or permit may be
issued upon a finding that public convenience and necessity require the proposed sPrvice as to a con1mon carrier,
or upon the fulfillment of specific criteria of need as
to a contract carrier.
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'rhP statutory method of issuance of authority is
<'otnplPtPd hy HPetion fl-l--(i-10, U.C.A. 1953, "'"hieh providP~:

B:l4-6-10. Ten1porary, sPasonal and emergen<'Y pertnits or licenses. The Commission shall
have po,ver, "'"ithout a hearing, to issue temporary sPasonal or emergency permits to contract
.. '
n1.ofor carriers in intrastate commerce, and temporary, sPasonal or emergency licenses to conI ract 1notor carr·icrs in interstate commerce. Such
pPrtnits and licenses may be issued upon such
inforn1ation, application or request therefor, as
the eon1n1ission may prescribe. Temporary, seasonal or e1nergency permits and licenses shall
~pPei f~· the commodity or number of passengers
to hP transported thereunder, together with the
point of origin and point of origin and point of
destination; but in no event shall any temporary,
~Pa~onal or emergency permit or license be issued
for a period of time greater than sixty days in
length. No fee shall be required by the ~Commis
~ion for the issuance of a temporary, seasonal or
en1ergency permit or license under the provisions
of this ~<~ction." (Italics added)
The terms of this section are unambigious, and
litnit the grant of temporary authority to contract motor
carrier~

for a duration of not to exceed sixty days.

The temporary authority issued to \\Tycoff is clearly
that of a common carrier. It authorizes transportation
of a ela~s of commodities throughout the State of Utah,
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and clearly imposes the obligation upon the carrier to
provide such transportation upon the request of any
shipper who offers the commodity for transport. There
is no contract or specific arrangement between Wycoff
and the shipper as is contemplated under a contract
carrier operation.
As is shown on the face of the application, these
permits were issued "under Title 54-6-10, Utah Code Annotated, 1953." Moreover, the permits are issued as
supplements to the express common carrier authority
of Wycoff under Certificate No. 1162-Sub 2, and by
the terms of the permits themselves are specifically
designed to remove the restrictions of the express transportation on so-called "contractors' items." It is inconceivable that a contract permit can be supplemental
to a common carrier certificate under ·the established
distinctions between the two types of for hire rarriers.
Under applicable legal definitions, there is no question as to the common carrier nature of the permit
issued to Wycoff.
In 13 Am. Jur. 2d, Carriers, Section 2, a common
carrier is defined as follo,vs :
"A common carrier may be defined, very generally, as one who holds himself out to the public
as engaged in the business of transporting persons or property from place to place, for comSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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pensation, offering- his sPrvires to the public genPrallv. The do1ninant and controlling factor in
detP~tnining thP status as one of a common carrier
is his public profPssion or holding out, by words
or by a course of conduct, as to the service offered
or performed, "'"ith the result that he may be
hPld liable for refusal, if there is no valid excuse,
to <'arry for all who apply ... "

i~

HA common carrier has the right to deterInine \\'"hat particular line of business he will follo\v, and hi~ obligation to carry is co-extensive
"·ith, and limited by, his holding out as to the
~nbjPets of carriage. Thus, it is not essential to
the ~tatus of one as a common carrier that he
rarry all kinds of property offered to him. If
he holds hiinself out as a carrier of a particular
kind of freight generally, prepared for carriage
in a particular 'vay, he will be bound to carry
only to the extent and in the manner proposed... "
~imilar concepts are found in 13 C.J .S. ~Carriers,
~eetions

•'

·

In 1:3 . Am. J ur. 2d, Carriers, Section 4, the definition
rPfinPd:

3 b(1) ruHl (2).

In Realty Purchasing Conlpany vs. Public Servic
C'on,·n. 9 l"'".2d 3'75, 3-!5 P.2d 606, 608 (1959), the court
smmnarizes the general rule in defining a common carrier a~ follo,vs:
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"A more basic question is presented by the
contention that defendant's operation is that of
a common carrier and not a contract carrier.
'The distinguishing characteristic of the former
is that it transports all persons who request such
service; whereas the latter renders the transportation service only to specific parties 'vith whom
it has contracts to do so."
The conclusion of Commisioner Gee in his dissent
recognizes the attributes of a common carrier, and the
fact that the Wycoff permit should be classified as a
common, not a contract, carrier. IIe states, R. l.t2:
"The conclusion is therefore inescapable that
this Commission was in error in granting the
temporary permits in question, since the statute,
Section 54-6-10, supra, lin1its the issuance of said
permits to contract motor carriers, a status to
which the respondent in this hearing has made
no claim; which the certificates of convenience
and necessity held by such carrier would negative; and which is not established by the temporary authorities sought and received, the same
being by their terms inherently common authorities."
In contrast to the dissent of Commissioner Gee, the
order is not so much a consideration of the facts of the
case against the background of the authority and jurisdiction of the Comn1ission, as an atte1npt to justify the
action of the Commission by one 1neans or another.
It is based upon t""o principal conceptions: the first,
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thnt it is difficult to deter1nine the distinction between
comtnon and contract carriers; the second, that since
therP nn~ orcasions \\rhen temporary common carrier
authority should be issued, the Commission should have
such authority either by finding it elsewhere in the
~tatutPs or in t hP claimed confusion of definition.
The first concept seems to stem from this Court's
opinion in lllcCarthy vs. Public Service Comm'n, 1~11 Ut.
~~!), 184 P.2d 220 (1947), at least this appears from
the extensive refer(lnce to the decision at page 8 of the
order (R. 13()). It is difficult to follow this reasoning.
That easP involved sand and gravel haulers, transporting generally \vithin 30 miles of the pits. The decision
points out the vital importance of the contracts between
the haulers and the shippers, and the specific and unique
arrange1nent "l'hich controlled the transportation. The
court com1nented, page 221,
'~ThPy

enter into an individual contract for
. b ••• "
each JO
uThe defendants have all been engaged in
the transportation of property for hire. But we
can find no evidence in the record which tends
to proYe that they have held themselves out "to
the public as W'illing to undertake for hire to
transport." The fact that each of them engages
in transportation for hire is not sufficient evidence that they hold themselves out to the public
to do so. Such a holding \v·ould make it possible
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to convert all contraet carriPrs into common carriers, a result \vhich obviously is not intendPd
by our code."
Again, page 222 :
~'The

trend of the testimony is all toward
individually negotiated contracts."
In holding the transportation to be that of a contract
carrier, the decision followed the general rule. It ·was
the specific agreement or contract bPt\veen thP carriPr
and shipper which provided the key to the rlassifi('ation.
In Rralty P1trchasiug Conzpany vs. F>ul;lic Srrvice
Comm'n, supra, Salt Lake Transportation Company operated under contracts \\Tith four major airline:-; in thP
transportation of passangers to and from the Salt Lake
Airport. Again, upon the sainP reasoning, thP court
found existence of contract carriage. ThP de(·ision is
consistent and rlear, there i~ no a1nbiguity or une(~r
tainty in its meaning.
The Utah decisions, and others, are eited in the
above cases, and are in accord \vith general authority
on the classification as bet\\'"een ronnllon and control
carriers. There appear~ no confusion, and no doubt
that thP vVyeoff te1nporary authority here is that of a
com1non earrirr. It had no contracts or special arrangeInents and served a rlass of the genPral public \Yithout
discrimination.
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The second concept of the Order is that the Comtnission'~ authority to issue temporary common carrier
permits or certificates is found in 54-4-1, U.·C.A. 1953,
or ~oinPhow in the other general sections which do not
relate specifically to motor carriers but apply to all
types of utilities. Section 54-4-1 reads as follows:

"54-4-1. General jurisdiction. The commission is hereby vested with power and jurisdiction
to supervise and regulate every public utility in
this state, and to supervise all of the business of
every such public utility in this state, and to do
all things, whether herein specificially designated
or in addition thereto, which are necessary or
convenient in the exercise of such power and
jurisdiction."
"\Vhere a specific power is conferred upon a Comnrlssion it is fundamental that this limits the extent of
a geneal grant of authority. Bamberger Electric Company rs. P1.tblic Utilities Com1n'n, 59 Ut. 35,1, 204 Pac.
:~14 (19:2:2.). Moreover, if 54-4-1 could grant so fundatnental a po"Ter as the right to issue a type of operating
authority, it would clearly be an unlawful delegation
of po,ver as there is not the slightest standard or criteria set forth in the staute pursuant to which the power
is to be exercised. Section 54-6-2, U.C.A.. 1953, of the
~[otor , ...ehicle Transportation Chapter provides that
the general utility laws shall be applicable only when
not in. conflict 1cith the Motor Vehicle Chapter. T·o authorize issuance of common carrier authority under a
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general utility act power, where Section 54-6-10 specifically limits the delegation, would be in direct conflict
with the Section, a result spPrifically prohibited.
Another facet of the second concept of the Order
is that the Commission has the power to issue common
carrier temporary authority because it requires such
authority. Apart from the fact that such matters arP
for the legislature to determine, and it has de·tPrminPd
otherwise, plaintiffs cannot accept the prPmises of thP
claim.
At page 9 (R. 137) the order states that situations
arise where some form of temporary authority 1nust be
issued to meet the public need. Reference is made to
petrole:um transportation during vV or ld \\Tar II. There
is no record on this, and it involves Inatters impossible
to anticipate on hearing. Transportation in this period
was controlled by the K ational Defense Transportation
Act enacted by Congress pursuant to its \var powers.
This matter is completely irrelevant to this proceeding.
At page 9 also, the order atten1pts justification on
the theory that it is necessary to deter1nine in advance
the financial feasibility of a carrier operation. This
cannot justify a grant of operating authority \Yithout
hParing, and the question of financial success exists to
an extent in every comn1on or contract carrier application. The Commission

ha~

an adequat< · staff to process
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through hParing and order any emergency application
in \VPll under ~ixty dayR. 1\foreover, under 54-6-20,
tT.C.A. 19;l:3, the C~ommission may at any time for cause,
~nch a~ financial considerations, suspend, alter, amend,
or r(lvoke any rPrtificate, permit or license issued by it.
It hn~ an1ple authority "~hich can be properly exercised
to fully n1eet any conceivable requirements if the operation dor~ not develop, from a financial standpoint, as
plannoo.
The order stresses, page 10 ( R. 138), the temporary
authority provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act
nrHlrr ~Prtion 210a(a). In the issuance of its regulations and interpretive decisions, the Utah Commission
has on oecasion referred to the decisions of the Inter~tntP Cormnerce Co1nmission as helpful analogy to its
pro<.~P~s of decision. Here, however, the concern is with
~pPeific statutes \\yhich are not persuasive but controlling
on each Comn1ission. If lTtah is to follow the Federal
act~, it is a matter of legislative concern. In any event,
the Federal and lTtah statutes are quite different in
cone~ pt.
~Petion :210a( a) of the Interstate Commerce Act ( 49
l·.~.C ..A.. , ~Pc. 310a) provides for issuance of temporary

authority for service by a common or contract carrier

for a period not to exceed 180 days. Under applicable
I.C.C. rPg-ulations, t".,.o types of temporary authority
Jnay he issued. The first is for an emergency temporary
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authority of not to exceed 30 days, which is issued without any prior notice. Thereafter, when regular temporary authority is involved, prior to its issuance a notice
detailing the application is forwarded to the interested
carrers. There is no hearing, but such carriers can and
do submit written summaries of their operations and
are permitted to show the nature and extent of the available carrier service. In this way the

~Commission

is

reasonably informed before it acts. Moreover, there is
the immediate right of appeal within the Commission
structure from decisions of the Temporary Authorities
Board.
The order then refers, page 10 (R. 138), to issuance
of temporary authority under the Federal statute relative to applications involving mergers or the purchase
or lease of carrier authorities or properties. This is
controlled by Section 210a(b) of the Interstate Commerce Act ( 49 U.S.C.A., Sec. 310a). This subsection
does not contemplate the crPation of ne\v authority, but
the grant of temporary approval, not to exceed 180 days,
of the opPration of the motor carrier properties sought
to be acquired, pending disposition of the application
for approval of acquisition under Section 5 of the .A.ct
( 49 U.S.C.A., Sec. 5). It does not conte1nplate ten1porary
operating authority in thP sense of that here involved,
as suggested by the order
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In ~hort, the elahned reasons \vhy thCl rlear intent
of thP ~tatutP 111ust be ignored are not persuasive, and
rnnnot in any Pvent be used to create a Commission
po\vPr \rhich i~ not intended or authorized by statute.
POINT II.
THE ISSUANCE BY THE COMMISSION OF TEMPORARY SIXTY DAY PERMITS IN CONSECUTIVE
ORDER OVER A PERIOD OF APPROXIMATELY
THREE YEARS WAS ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS, AND TANTAMOUNT TO ISSUANCE OF
PERMANENT AUTHORITY WITHOUT HEARING,
CONTRARY TO LAW.

One of the most disturbing aspects of this proceeding

i~

the aetion of the Commission in issuing successive

tetnporary authorities of sixty days' duration during a
period of over threP years, without hearing or notice
to intere~tPd carriers. The plaintiffs collectively provide
tran~portation s~)rvice

throughout most of

-c tah,

and

are not a\vare of any transportation emergency on tractor~·

and 1nachinery dealers' repair parts, supplies and

P4tniptnent bet,veen all points and places in the State.
The rPa~on~ for the three year grant are not fully known
to plaintiffs, and there is no \Yay they can be deter-

tnined under the administratiYe process followed in this
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Page 5 of the Commission order (R. 133) refers to
an application of Wycoff for general commodities in
express service between Salt Lake City and points in
Grand and San Juan Counties, hearing on \vhich was
concluded March 9, 1962. That application, in Case No.
4252-Sub 9, was denied by the Commission in its order
of June 13, 1962, for failure of proof of convenience and
necessity. Yet apparently this case is deemed to provide
some justification for grant of temporary authority
here, since the order states that the witnesses expressed
a desire for express service. On page 11 (R. 139) the
order refers to transportation need claims of contractors'
and machinery companies as justification for grant of
temporary authority to Wycoff. Presun1ably, thP emergency need extended over a three year period. It is
believed that a number of the co1npanies who presumably supported the requests for temporary authority
are among those who appeared in Case -!252-Sub 9 on
hearing.
The order then states at the san1e page that the
Wycoff service is not fully available from any otlwr
carrier, a fact vigorously denied by plaintiffs. Upon
what evidence does the Com1nission rule? There is no
\\'"ay in \\'"hieh this can be detern1ined, since there has
been no hearing or opportunity for the protesting carriers to consider the staten1ents of shippers and to present their own evidence and view·s on the InattPr.
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Page 4 of thP order (R. 132) refers to certain applif•ations of Wycoff for operating authority which are
pPnding before the Comrnission. Of these, subsection
(h) would appear to seek authority to transport comDlodities here involved throughout Utah in express service \vithout restriction. The application was filed on
~\u~st 5, 1960, and has never been called for hearing.
The order then points out (R. 132) that the processing
nnd hearing of the various pending applications of Wyrnff ha~ been complicated, if not in fact made impossible,
hy reason of various other proceedings involving Wycoff
"'hirh are or have been before the ·Commission. Plaintiffs cannot agree.
Here again, is an example in these proceedings of
ad1ninistrative expediency. Certainly Wycoff or any
rarri~r is entitlPd to have its application heard within
a reasonable time after filing. To postpone the application is not in accord with the powers granted to the
Conm1ission. It certainly cannot justify issuance of temporary authority during a delay period of three years.
In short, it is clear that the Commission exceeded
its jurisdiction in the issuance of the temporary authorities in this case, and that such issuance for all
practical purposes constituted grant of permanent authority without hearing or notice.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

24
CONCLUSION
:The implications of this proceeding extend far beyond the matters here involved. They affect every Utah
administrative board and agency, since they involve the
simple issue as to whether or not the powers conferred
by the legislature are to be observed in their limitations
or ignored on the basis of expediency, however well intentioned.
'There is no justification for the grant of temporary
common carrier authority to Wycoff in view of the
powers, with specific limitation, granted to the Commission to deal with the emergency transportation requirements of the public under Section 54-6-10, I;.C.A.
1953. Such Section provides the Commission with ample
authority to meet any transportation emergency of the
shipping public through grant of contract carrier permits. There is no reason "\Yhy the Commission cannot
within the sixty day period process an application for
permanent authority to meet any such need, and it does
not matter whether the application be for contract or
common carrier authority.
The Commission should be compelled to exercise
its powers in accordance \vith legislative delegation. The
temporar~r

authority permit of Wycoff Company, Incor-

porated should be vacated, and in this and all proceed-
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ings the Commission should be restricted to issuance of
temporary emergency grants of authority for contract
carriers.

Respectfully submitted,
WO·OD· R. WORSLE~Y,
Attorney for Plaintiffs

701 Continental Bank Bldg.
Salt Lake ~City, Utah

DATE·D : June 4, 1964

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

APPENDIX
IJEFORE THE PUBLIC SER.VICE COMMISION

OF UTAH

In the Matter of the Application of WY-

COFF COMPANY,

INCORPORATE~D

Tetnporary Permit to haul emergency
contractor's supplies.

CO~l~liSSIONER

Case No.
5242
REPORT
AND
ORDER

RAYMOND W. GE·E ·, DISSENT'-

1X<1:

I disagree \vith the Report and Order of the Comnnsston.

\Yycoff Company, Incorporated, respondent in this
proceeding, is a common motor carrier operating under
Certificate of Convenience and Necessity No. 1162 and
~nbs thereunder. On or about May 31, 1961, and subsequent thereto this Commission issued to said carrier
biinonthly temporary per1nits to haul contractor's and
machinery dealer's repair parts, supplies and equipment
in etuergency shipments to repair on job locations. The
Appendix 1
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hauls were for contractors and equipment dealers between all places in Utah. The series of temporary permits thus issued successfully cover the period fro1n
May 31, 1961, to the present, there being outstanding
temporary authority covering the aforementioned commodities through the 18th day of ~larch, 1964. No notice
to interested parties was given prior to the issuance of
the temporary permits referred to above.
The complainants, Continental Bus System, Inc.,
and D·enver-Salt Lake-Pacific Stages, Inc., operate as
common motor carriers of passengers and property under Certificates of Convenience and Necessity Numbers
846· and subs thereunder, and 447 and subs thereundPr,
respectively; that as a result of the issuance of the
temporary permits, complainants allege that traffic has
been diverted from them.
Wycoff Company, Incorporated, has held itself out
to transport, and has transported the commodities, and
within the geographical area, as set forth in the temporary authorities aforementioned.
According to the terms of the applications for the
per1nits aforementioned, the temporary authority was
sought pursuant to Section 54-6-10, U.C.A., 1953.
'The cornplainants ask by W'ay of relief that any
outstanding te1nporary per1nit e1nbracing the conlmodities set forth above be vacated and declared void, and
Appendix 2
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that th.- ~a1ne hP not issuPd or reissued in the future in
tlw tnnnner eotn plained of, or in a manner contrary to
lnw.
() f the Heveral legal issues raised by the complain-

ants, I a1n of the opinion that the issue of Commission
authority to hP decisive.
SPetion 54-6-5, U.C.A., 1953, provides in part:
Hit shall be unlawful for any common motor
earriPr to operate as a carrier in intrastate comlllPI'eP \vithin this state without first having obtained frotn the commission a certificate of conveniPnrP and necessity. The commission, upon
the filing of an application for such certificate,
shall fix a time and place for hearing thereon,
". hich shall be not less than ten days after such
filing. • • • *"
~rhe

requirement of a hearing under the foregoing
~tntutt\ and as a precedent to the issuance of authority
to operate as a common carrier in intrastate commerce
i~ unequivocal, and has not been obviated by any other
rtah statut~.
That contract carriers, as distinguished from comHlon carriers, 1nay be issued temporary, seasonal, or
Ptnergeney permits, \vithout a hearing, is indicated 1n
~ection 54-ti-10, t ... C..A.. , 1953, \Yhich provides:
.A. ppendix 3
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"The commission shall have power, 'vithout
a hearing, to issue temporary, seasonal, or emergency permits to contract motor carriers in intrastate commerce, and temporary, seasonal or emergency licenses to contract motor carriers in interstate commerce. Such permits and licenses may
be issued upon such information, application or
request therefor, as the commission may prescribe. Temporary, seasonal, or emergency permits and licenses shall specify the commodity or
number of passengers to be transported thereunder, together with the point of origin and point
of destination; but in no event shall any temporary, seasonal or emergency permit or license be
issued for a period of time greater than sixty
days in length. No fee shall be required by the
Commission for the issuance of a temporary,
seasonal, or emergency permit or license under
the provisions of this section."
The applications for temporary permits in question
indicate the authorities were sought under Section 54-610, U.!C.A.., 1953, and the temporary permits issued pursuant to that statute.
1

'The terms of Section 54-6-10, supra, allow the issuance of temporary seasonal, or emergency permits to
"contract motor carriers." 'Vycoff Company, Incorporated, is a "common motor carrier," and not a "contract
motor carrier," as those terms are defined under Chapter 6, Title 54, U.C.A., 1953, and the temporary authority
requested1 and granted """as and is in the nature of a
common motor carrier authority rather than that of a
contract motor carrier.
lCf. Section 11.3, Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Public Service Commission.

Appendix 4
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ThP ronelnsion i~ therpfore inescapable that this
(•ornrnission "·a~ in error in granting the temporary perrnits in quPstion, sineP thP statutP, SPetion 54-6-10, supra,
lilnits thP issuaneP of said permits to contract motor
<·nrrit:\rs, a status to which thP respondent in this hearing
hns tnadP no claitn; "·hich the C(lrtificates of convenience
and nl\ePssity held by ~uch carrier would negative; and
\vhirh is not established by the temporary authorities
soug-ht and received, the same being hy their terms inhPrPntly cotnmon authorities.
I run not in accord "·ith the argument that this
<'Otntnis~ion has itnplied authority to issue temporary
or PHH?rg-Pney pern1its under its broad statutory powers,
stweifically thosP set forth in Section 5+-4-1, U.C.A.,
195:t That ~Pet ion provides:
''The cotntnission is hereby vested with power
and jurisdiction to supervise and regulate every
public utility in this state, and to supervise all
of the business of every such public utility in
this state, and to do all things, whether herein
~pecifically designated or in addition thereto,
"·hich are necessary or convenient in the exercise
of such power and jurisdiction."

/

Even "~PrP one to ignore the form of the applications and permits in question, i.e., that the authority
\\·as sought and granted under Section 54-6-10, supra,
and eonsider the substance of the authority sought and
g-ranted, the cone lusion 'vould be the san1e.
~\ppendix

5
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According to 3 Sutherland, Statutory
~6603,

Con~truction,

at page 268 :
"Administrative agencies are purely creatures of legislation without inherent or common
la\Y powers. The general rule applies to statutes
granting po"'ers to administrative boards, agencies or tribunals is that only those powers are
granted which are expressly or by necessary implication conferred, and the effect usually has
been to accomplish a rather strict interpretation
against the exercise of the power claimed by the
administrative body. The rule has been variously
phrased, including language to the effect that a
power must be 'plainly' expressed; that a power
is not to be 'inferred' or taken by 'implication':
or that the jurisdiction of an administrative
agency is not to be 'presumed.' "

While a more liberal construction than that set
forth above has been applied in some cases involving
public utility agencies, it is my conviction that the more
restrictive interpretation is applicable, especially in the
situation at hand where property rights of the applicant
and competing carriers are affected by the grant or
denial of the temporary common carrier authority without a hearing.

In Bamberger Electric Conzpany vs. Public Utilities
Commision, 59

l~tah

351, 204 Pac. 314-, the Supreme

Court of Utah held:
Appendix 6
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··• • • • It nPPds no ei tat ion of authoritiPs
that \rhPrP a spPeific po\\'(\r iH conferred by statutP upon a tribunal, hoard, or cornmission with
lituited po,vpr:-;, the po\\·Prs are litnited to such
as a l'P s pee i fie all~· 1nentioned. Any other rule
\\'tntld tnake an antorrat of a utilitiPs cornmission .

.....

,

'\'hile HPetion rl-+--+-1, lT .(~.A., 1953, as amended,
,."~t~ general jurisdiction in the co1nmission to superrise and rPgulate public utilities and ~~* * * * to do all
thin~s, wht\ther herein specifically designated or in ad(lition therPto, "·hieh arP nPePssary or convenient in the
Px.erci~P of :-\Ueh po\\·Pr and jurisdiction,'' I interpret this
statute to grant authority expressly set forth or neces~arily ituplied, and not to constitute a carte blanche,
or gTant of full disrrPtionary power.
The lTtah legislature has expressly provided for two
typt\~ of tPnlporary earrier authority: (1) The permits
of a tPtuporary, seasonal, or emergency nature issued
to l'ontract Inotor carriers under Section 5-±-6-10, U.C.A.,
l !l.-):~. to "?hich rPference has been made heretofore; (2)
the tPtnporary continuance of motor carrier operations
follo\\ing the death of one who holds authority for such

operation. Such interim rights are expressly set forth

[,.;:·

..

\.

in detail in Section 5-±-6-2-t, t T.C.A., 1953. If Section
;l-l--l-1, lT.C ..A., 1953, delegates the sweeping authority
elaitned hy the conunission, then there would be no need

whnt:'ot

1

Ytkr.

to enact Section 5-l--6-:2-t.
.A.ppendix 7
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Two familiar rules of statutory construction 2 dictate
that with enactment of Sections 54-6-10 and 54-G-2-t,
U.C.A., 1953, and the specific provisions thereunder, no
additional authority to issue temporary permits can be
implied from statutes conferring general powers.
Further attendant difficulty with any construction
of Section 54-4-1, supra, which 'Yould allow the grant of
temporary carrier authority, is the total absence of legislative guides relating to the duration of that authority,
conditions precedent to its issuance, and 'vhether successive grants are permitted. :This lack of legislative
standards suggests difficult administration, if not questionable constitutionality of the contended for statutory
interpretation.
·The Utah L:egislature can articulate explicitly on
the subject of temporary 1notor carrier authority, and
has done so in respect to contract carriers (Section 5-l-610, supra), and the temporary continuance of common
and contract motor carrier authority in the event of
the death of the holder (Section 54-6-24, supra). For
this commission to indulge in any generous statutory
interpretations which result in the grant of temporary
common motor carrier authority otherwise than as set
forth in Sections 54-6-10 and 54-6-24, supra, is error,
2Expresio units exclusio alterius est (The expression of one thing is
(implies) the exclusion of another); Expressium facit cessure taciturn
(that which is expressed puts an end to that which is implied.)

Appendix 8
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is thP easP here, the issuance of such
twrtnit~ "·n~ donP in good faith, and pretnised in the
}Hthl ie intere~ t.

PVt\n

though,

as

~or doP~

thP apparent long standing policy and practi('P of this commission in granting temporary authorities
to eonunon n1otor rarri~rs, upon proper showing, justify
t ht- roncln~ion that the commission has authority to issue
thP typP permit in question. A eontemporaneous or practical construction of a statutP hy an administrative
ageney for a long period of time is of great weight
nnd persuasive influence in the interpretation of that
lP.goislation, only if the statute is ambiguous. Alexander
Y~. BenJH•tt, 5 Utah 2d 163, 298 P.2d 823; Murdock vs.
~fahey, 39 lT tah 346, 203 P. 651 ; 50 Am. J ur ., Statutes,
pp. 309..31 :!. The statutes in question here are neither
ntnbiguou~ nor of doubtful meaning, the only conflict
ari~ing frotn the administrative practice itself. Therefore, thP contemporaneous or practical construction of
~Prtion~ 54-4-1 and 54-6-10, indulged in by this comtnission cannot be permitted to control, modify or enlarge the plain meaning of thrsr statutes.
The critical result of any legal analysis of the question at is~lH:") is "Thether or not a hearing, upon due notice,
and ~pt•eific finding~ are required before this commis-

~ion tnay grant common tnotor carrier authority to an

applicant. The jist of tny disagreement is that such a

h~aring-. notice and proof is required before any authori~\ppendix

9
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ty can be granted to a common motor carrier to operate
in intrastate commerce. I am of the conviction that
Section 54-6-5, U.C.A., 1953, sets forth the only procedural and substantive basis upon \Vhich a com1non motor
carrier may operate in intrastate co1nmerce, which statute by its terms is clear and void of ambiguity.
But assume for the sake of argument either or both
of the following:
(a) That this commission has authority to issue a
common motor carrier authority, of temporary duration,
without a hearing,
(b) tThat the temporary grants here involved are
in the nature of contract motor carrier permits - and
issued pursuant to Section 54-6-10, supra.

There still remains unresolved the question of
whether this commission has authority to issue seventeen successive temporary permits to the same carrier,
embracing the same commodities, and covering a period
from May 31, 1961 through March 18, 1964, \vithout a
hearing, a showing of proof, or opportunity for any
protestant to be heard.
Although the permits 1n question were issued in
good faith, the commission being motivated by a concern for the public \velfare, this action in my opinion
Appendix 10
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wa~

in eX<>t'~~ ot' tht• po\vers of thi~ agency. thP taeking
of thP pPrnlit~ having in fact thP ('ffpet of a grant of
pPrnument authority. ThP require1nents of a hearing
urHh•r both SP<'tion 3~-G-5. supra, (for a co nun on carrier)
and ~•·<·t.ion 54-ti-8, U.C.A., 1953, (for a contract carrier),
and the rP~ulting protection to th(' public and existing
transportation facilitiPs have been totally frustrated in
thi~ i11~tance hy the issuance of consecutive permits.

In my opinion all doubts should be resolved in favor
of due notire and adequate opportunity for all interested
partiP~ to be heard; the temporary permit now held by
\ryeoff Co1npany, Incorporated, expiring on the 18th
day of ~r a reh, 1964, relating to the transportation of
contractor's and machinery dealer's repair parts, suppliPs and equipment, should be vacated forthwith.
Date dat Salt Lake City, Utah, this 7th day of February, 196-l.

/s/ Raymond W. Gee, ·Commissioner
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